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1.  Introduction. 
 
      In today’s world population growth is regarded as a problem by most of the 
policymakers and people who deal with social, economic, and demographic topics. 
This concern, of course, goes back at least to Malthus, and his predictions based on 
the dynamics of population growth vis a vis economic budget restrictions. At the 
start of the 21st century prices of some of the basic food products have begun to 
demonstrate price increases. In general, many people think that if there are too 
many people now, the situation is going to be even more difficult in the future. 
Although the price of calories and energy has risen during the last decade, the 
world is not only increasingly populated but also increasingly industrialized and 
rich. The answer to the question if there are too many people deserves more 
attention, since population growth can have negative as well as positive aspects. In 
the 19th and 20th centuries population growth and the increased population 
density were considered to be a positive asset for many nations: it could provide 
for economies of scale, cheaper labor, and the basis for urbanization and economic 
growth.  
    In spite of all these worries, about continued population growth, population 
growth while still positive has been doing so at diminishing rates since 1970. A key 
question is if there are too many children, with population growth reflecting the 
high rate of fertility? Or has the population explosion in recent years been due to   3 
improved health standards and diminished mortality, as a consequence of material 
prosperity and technological progress? 
     In this paper we are trying to provide some preliminary data that may be helpful 
to build the world picture in terms of the variables that influence demographic 
growth and their regional variance. This is an exploratory paper that intends to 
frame some of the working hypotheses on the reasons behind demographic growth 
and its most plausible future evolution. On the basis of preliminary results we hope 
to be able to model the population dynamics during the second half of the 20t 
century at the world level in forthcoming papers, based on economic, 
demographic, and cultural factors.  These include, in particular, female and child 
education and employment, infant mortality, and changing income levels, in 
addition to ethnic differentials.  In a very intuitive way we shall first concentrate 
on the issue of which is the determinant variable behind demographic growth: 
fertility (and therefore reproductive habits) or mortality (and therefore evolution 
in health). We avoid here any analysis on nuptiality since in the period under 
consideration the strength and influence of religion in family formation and the  
ages of conception of the first child had loosened much of the previous importance 
it had before 1960 on fertility dynamics.  
 
 On the other hand for historical populations, it would be very difficult to find an 
homogeneous indicator for family formation and nuptiality.  Most of the literature 
and papers on historical demography deal with Europe and the US and therefore 
with populations that were inside the “European demographic system” (Flinn, 
1985) in which conception of children was undertaken by a married and 
monogamous couple.  Indeed most of the statistical calculations on nuptiality and 
fertility are based on this sort of family arrangement.  But when we enlarge the 
sample to all civilizations and religions of the world we must make some 
simplifications regarding the culture and motivations behind being married and 
the conception of children.  In some African societies polygamy does exist and the 
ability to conceive children basically depends on the fertility of the women and not 
on other social or cultural determinants as in most of Western societies.  We want 
to stress that we are conscious of this limitation, and that when we try to capture   4 
fertility patterns that are common and statistically significant for all the people of 
the world, we lose explanatory power.  Therefore the questions we put to the data 
and the results that follow in this introduction are relevant only to fertility 
patterns that represent the interests of the second half of the twentieth century.  
We think that the limitations that nuptiality had for the 19th century European 
demographic system should be relevant in a context in which fertility was 
expanding and therefore the calculation of the actual available years to conceive by 
women was a key factor for the level of fertility.  As we will see our intent is not to 
explain which factors prevent female fertility from reaching its potential levels, but 
just the opposite.  We will try to explain the main factors behind the decline in 
fertility, so that the social factors that prevent attaining the maximum reproductive 





2.  ARE DEMOGRAPHIC PATTERNS CONVERGING ACROSS THE WORLD? 
 
 
    In the concluding volume to the seminal work on the demographic transition in 
Europe, Watkins  and Knodel and van de Walle  (1986) argued that in spite of the 
existence of sharp differences in the economic achievements of European countries 
there was a great deal of coincidence in the timing of the demographic transition 
inside most of the countries of Western Europe. In the European cases of the 19th 
century, it appears that after a certain threshold level of per capita GDP, epidemics 
and hunger crisis caused by food scarcity ceased to threaten the population, and 
adult mortality and infant mortality diminished. More recently, as Becker,et  al 
(2005) indicate over the last half-century convergence in life expectation has 
occurred, with more rapid increases in countries with initially lower levels and   5 
with a sharp decline in variation across countries.  Thus declines in mortality 
throughout the world have occurred with more similarity in timing than would be 
predicted based on economic factors. 
     At the same time, urbanization and industrial growth brought with it the 
diminution of legitimate fertility. By means of the diffusion of information that was 
facilitated by internal migrations, the revolution of communications and the 
increasing ability to read and write of people, towns increased their influence on 
the demographic behavior of extended regions and countries (Wrigley,2004; De 
Vries, 1985 ).  This is why, in spite of economic divergence, population dynamics 
tended to converge. The possibility brought by the transport revolution and 
migration to exchange information with other people on how the improve health 
and reproductive practices were among the factors that fostered territorial 
homogeneity and the diffusion of demographic variables not only in 19th century 
England but more broadly speaking Eurorpe (Coale and Watkins 1986; Wrigley, 
and Schofield, 1989, 1997; De Vries 1985; Wrigley,2004). Other authors, using 
micro historical methods have emphasized the distinctive features of several 
European regions putting the stress on religious beliefs and socioeconomic 
variables that may help to explain why regions have similar but not always 
identical behavior (Brown and Guinenne, 2002)  . 
     Because of its early date, the European demographic transition is unique. In 
figures 1 and 2 we see that as late as 1960 in the post WW II period, most of the 
world had high rates of fertility and infant mortality. Therefore by 1960, during the 
Golden Age of Capitalism, the demographic regimes still had not experienced any 
demographic transition in most of the regions of the world. This is particularly true 
for poor countries or the countries that Jeff Sachs identify as experiencing the 
tropical pattern of poverty. As late as 1995 this set of tropical countries were 
among the poorest of the world, and this fact has fostered a long literature on the 
geographic reasons for economic growth, or its absence, but this is not the issue 
that most interest, us here. What is important for our argument is that the poorest 
countries of the world in 1960 (countries in the tropics) were those exhibiting 
highest rates of fertility and infant mortality. It is plausible to think that in this set 
of countries the communications and information exchange network we discussed   6 
before still had to develop in order to make possible the diffusion of fertility and 
infant mortality decline, innovations that had begun in the developed world. 
     The world scenario changed significantly however by 2000. Contemporary 
with the communications revolution, by this  date most of the world had moved to 
modern demographic patterns characterized by, relatively low fertility rates and 
low infant mortality rates. Therefore the transition from  a high fertility (and high 
infant mortality) regime, a   situation in which most of the world exhibits relatively 
low numbers of children and low infant mortality was achieved in many places by 
the eve of the twenty-first century. The main deviant from this pattern are the 
countries of Sub-Saharan Africa. This particular case is striking because not only is 
this a high fertility region but it is also the region with highest levels of infant and 
adult mortality. Therefore in this belated demographic transition at the world level 
there is still a set of countries that remain behind marked by characteristics that 
seem to limit economic growth. In the Sub Saharan African case, these were not 
only wars and civil wars, but also hunger and illness (pandemics) leading to death. 
These help explain the high levels of mortality observed, and also the high levels of 
fertility with the high probability of death during the first year of life. 
In figures and tables we can see the features of the world’s regional evolution. 
Notice in the figures the trend of the variables regarding both fertility and 
mortality across regions to converge. Even with some delay the most backward 
regions of the world demographically speaking like Sub- Saharan Africa and South 
Asia exhibit a trend to converge with the core countries of Europe, North America, 
and Australia. With this figure we can answer to some of the questions we put in 
the introduction which are why is world population growing: world population is 
growing, not because of an increase in fertility levels, but because the 
improvement of the health conditions of an important set of world countries.  In all 
countries mortality and infant mortality conditions improve, due to by the 
possibility of most of the world population to live longer and with relatively higher 
living standards. 
 
   7 
 
3. A model of the reasons causing fertility decline. 
 
 
    The most relevant studies (and the data we present) indicate that fertility and 
mortality tend to converge in the period under consideration. We have also 
observed that the relationship between demographic variables and income levels 
is not linear. When attempting to give forecasts on the levels of future population 
the variables that seem to be of most concern are changes in fertility (Sachs, 2008; 
see also UN Human Developent Reports). As said above life expectancies have 
improved by a considerable amount during the 20th century, in a most remarkable 
manner until the 1960s, thanks to improvements in nutrition and health 
achievements (Fogel, 2005).  As a general point    life expectancies appear to have 
diminishing returns with respect to income, and Fogel’s forecasts is that during the 
21st century they are not going to increase by more that 10-15 years (compared 
with the 20th century in which they nearly doubled).  In section 2 we indicated that 
fertility has a tended to converge at a low level, close to replacement.  Africa 
remained the continent that still has the highest rates. The high fertility rates of 
poor countries (mainly in Sub-Saharan Africa) remains a matter of concern for the 
UN. Even if the fertility rates are diminishing, with the present  demographic 
patterns the Net Reproduction Rates indicate that in this group of countries the 
population should double every thirty years. According to the same source of 
information if all countries of the world, including Sub-Saharan Africa, achieve 
fertility rates close to the replacement level, by 2050 the world population should 
attain a peak of 9.1 billion which is a threshold that most economic authorities 
hope not to surpass (Sachs, 2008, p. 167). 
 
    Therefore the common opinion of demographic planners is that we should try to 
attain to fertility levels close to the replacement level or below, in order not to 
undermine world stability. In this section we try to model the factors influencing   8 
fertility and in the next section we present a regression analysis based on the 
variables of the model discussed here. 
 
                                          FIGURE 1 
 
 
     In Figure  1   we divide the variables affecting fertility into endogenous variables 
and exogenous variables. All endogenous variables are those related to economic 
growth   
and are the main set of variables considered by most of the models dealing with 
the European Demographic Transition that we have described in section 2. In 
section 2 we made the point that in spite of there being mechanisms of the 
diffusion of fertility patterns that were not linked to economic factors, according to 
most studies of fertility including those dealing with the British Industrial 
Revolution and its spread over the European continent,  the diminution of fertility 
rates are frequently linked to endogenous factors  that might be linked to 
economic growth: improvement of living standards, urbanization and internal 
migrations, improvement of the supply of services offering health and education, 
improvement of  agrarian technologies and  changes in the prices of food (Wrigley,   9 
various dates, Wrigley Schofield, De Vries, Knodell et al 1986). Therefore the initial 
variable we want to look at is the impact on fertility of changes in the level of per 
capita GDP. 
 
    But clearly other exogenous variables that are not directly related to the 
countries’ economic growth can also explain fertility in the poor countries in the 
decades examined. These variables include: infant mortality, female education, and 
factors related to race diversity. According to Williamson (1998) infant mortality 
has played a major role in explaining the fertility changes in countries of East and 
South Asia in recent decades. For Williamson this variable is exogenous since it 
mainly depends on the importance of scientific knowledge (vaccines, antibiotics, 
penicillin, etc) developed by Western World medical innovation power during the 
20th century. The sharp effect of the diminution of infant mortality on the increase 
of the number of surviving children led to a subsequent diminution of total number 
of births per family, in order to maintain the number of the surviving offspring. 
 
    Another exogenous factor influencing the preferences of families to have more or 
less children is the education level of the mother. According to the data provided 
by Barro and Lee (2000) on the female/male education ratio (measured by means 
of the life expectancy of people to continue in the school system according to the 
regions of the world), the amount of education women receive is culturally shaped 
and the regions of the world less likely to invest in women’s human capital are in 
East and South Asia (see Boserup,1970; Barro-Lee 2000; Sen, 1990,1992,2003) . 
But in societies where the families invest in the human capital of women, this  can 
lead to an increase of the value of their paid work (wages) at the expense of the 
opportunity costs of unpaid housework, like child rearing,  child bearing ,and  
other unpaid labor loads. As a consequence of this price unbalance women change 
their preferences and begin to allocate more time to paid work and less time to 
reproductive work and other unpaid activities. The last consequence of all what we 
have said is that fertility should diminish and female participation levels increase 
(Galor, Weil, 1996; Dreze and Sen, 1995; Caldwell, 1982). Most interestingly, more 
educated women not only produce less children but also higher quality of children   10
(Becker, 1991). In poor countries the effects of the education of the mother on the 
health and education of the children have been successfully outlined by the 
literature (Le Vine et alt, 1991, Baizan, Camps, 2007). 
 
    A third exogenous factor is race. While differences in the demographic patterns 
according to race are narrowing as it has been proved by the convergence of 
mortality rates of black and whites in the US during the second half of the 20th 
century (see the table) in some parts as a consequence of the democratization of 
the supply of public goods, such as water sanitation and other health services (see 
Troesken, 2004), as well as some convergence in income levels.  
 
    In the following section we present 2 models. The first is presented in order to 
identify the relevant variables to explain the evolution of fertility at the world 
level, using the variables previously described. Since there is a considerable 
difference in the numerical magnitude of the variables the model is presented in 2 
ways: in absolute numbers multiplying the values of fertility and infant mortality 
per 1000 and in logarithmic terms. In the second model we present the variables 
affecting the gender gap since women’s education shall appear as one of the main 
factors that can lead to the reduction of fertility. 
                  
4. The empirical results on variables affecting fertility.  
     In table we present the results of regression 1. Regression 1 is based on panel of 
data for 138 countries of the world for which we have continuous information 
every five years in the period 1960-2000. The total number of observations is 805 
and we avoid here country fixed effects since some variables as race or the ethnic 
fractionalization are constants. The variables we include in this linear regression 
are per capita GDP, population size, infant mortality, the interaction of infant 
mortality with brown and indian races, the interaction of infant mortality with 
black population, female education, ethnic fractionalization, the effects of ethnic 
composition, and time effects.   11
 
     The most significant results of the table are the very low explanatory power of 
levels of income (per capita GDP) and the very high impact of infant mortality and 
women education. Taken into account that the dependent variable is fertility 
rates*1000 the impact of income is nearly nil.  From this finding we can imply that 
the impact of variables endogenous, associated with economic growth (such as 
those presented in the diagram: living standards, urbanization, internal 
migrations, services supply) are nearly irrelevant to explain the evolution of 
fertility during the second half of the 20th century. This may be because in this 
stage, most (of course not all) of the countries already have achieved the minimum 
supplies of health services and other public goods that are significant of the 
modern world of the 20th century, like water sanitation, well established 
transports and communication networks, basic agrarian technologies to avoid 
price volatility of foodstuffs. It also may be caused to the fact that in the 
period here under consideration, the world has been increasingly globalised 
in communications and transportation and therefore the human capital 
diffusion factors that were so important for describing the spread of the 
Demographic changes in Europe were already established at the world level 
during the second half of the 20th century. Indeed in model 2 of the 2nd 
regression (Table 5) we obtain the result that the share of urban population 
at the country level has very significant effects on fertility. In figure 1, 
inspired in the literature dealing with 19th century European demographic 
transition, we stated the conclusion the urbanization rates could be 
considered endogenous to economic growth. But this may not be truth in the 
second half of the 20th century when countries of the Third World began to 
exhibit high rural to urban migration flows and high levels of urbanization. 
According to model 2 of table 5 urbanization rates are very significant to 
explain variations of fertility levels showing the further implications that the 
availability of information that towns and cities make possible have on the 
diffusion of new fertility patterns. 
     Therefore, if income is not the relevant variable, which are the really significant 
variables?   According to our model the relevant variables are those presented   12
above as exogenous to the family formation preferences: infant mortality, female 
education, and race (particularly the difference between black and white). The 
increase of 1 point of infant mortality rates has as a result the increase 0.012 in the 
number of children per woman.  The increase of 1 year in the length of women 
schooling has as a result a reduction in 0.361 in the number of children of that 
women. Blacks had higher fertility levels, above those of the brown or India 
populations. Nonetheless when we interact the variable being black by the infant 
mortality we see that this combination has a negative result on fertility levels. This 
fact may be caused by the negative effect on fertility brought by extraordinary 
mortalities caused by civil wars and pandemics in Africa South of the Sahara. These 
mortality epidemics and war have as an effect the imbalance of the sex ratio at the 
country level or the impossibility for many women to have children because of the 
diffusion of illnesses like AIDS. 
 
    From our results we can conclude that if we want to diminish fertility levels of 
Africa South of the Sahara and other poor countries the way to do this is by 
improving infant mortality conditions by means of scientific medical innovations 
that allow for the eradication of pandemics like AIDS, HIV, or malaria. These 
epidemic mortalities affect people of all ages and, as a matter of fact, are among of 
the reasons why people don’t act according to expectations to be better off in the 
future. High levels of infant mortality also mean that surviving children are only a 
limited number of those born.. Therefore many women will conceive a lot of 
children in order to ensure that some of them will survive to adulthood and then 
they can offer some support to the family when the parents grew old. 
 
     Another result is the impact of female education on fertility levels. In table 6 we 
present results relating to the variables affecting the gender gap as female/male 
earnings at the world level. We only have results on the variables for this second 
model for the year 2003, and therefore the regression is just a cross section across 
countries. But the results are significant. This is a very important implication if we 
want to control the levels of fertility, as has been done in the recent past in   13
countries like China and India. In maps presented in section 2 you can observe that 
in both countries the levels of fertility have diminished sharply in the decades from 
1960 to 2000, mainly because of policies of family planning exogenously imposed 
on  couples. Since these societies are very biased regarding gender, the result of 
policies like the 1 child policy in China has been the increase of girls’ infant 
mortality relative to boys, in sharp contrast to what happen in the rest of the 
world. We don’t mean that this fact suggest the practice of infanticide in this 
countries. But if the couple wants a boy and the policy restricts the number of 
children per couple to one, then if the first born is a girl the main consequence is 
that parents want to deliver her in adoption or as in the case of Taiwan to a minor 
marriage. All these mean an increase of the levels of infant mortality of girls 
relative to boys, as several research projects suggest. This is an important 
externality of family planning policies that is clearly observable on these maps and 
politically these should be avoided in future demographic programs aiming at 
diminishing fertility levels and population growth. 
  As a final remark, we think it is important to realize what we have tried to stress 
several times in this paper: the link between income and fertility is not linear and 
many exogenous variables like medical and scientific improvements,  or gendered 
cultural biases or racial identity also have an important role on the evolution of 
fertility. As stated in the introduction in this paper we have just tried to define 
which and why these variables are important. Anyway, it is worth noting here that 
if in section 2 we have observed that fertility patterns have a world converging 
trend in the period  under study (1960-2000), the exogenous variables we have 
dealt with here also tend to converge. While  the trend of world living standards to 
converge has also been stressed by some authors (Sala-i-Martin, 2005) this 
remains a source of intellectual discussion (Becker, 2005; Williamson,2001; 
Engerman and Sokoloff, 2002, 2005). 
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4. CONCLUSION 
 
    In recent years there has been some common movement in a number of 
demographic variables in most parts of the world, although substantial differences 
in levels of these variables remain. What is perhaps most interesting is the 
similarity in timing of these movements in fertility and mortality rates, and in the 
various related explanatory factors such as infant mortality rates, years of 
schooling of females, female labor force participation, and the relevant economic 
factors. The similarity in timing of change raises question about the importance of 
country specific factors as opposed to those influenced by broader cross-country 
and international forces. This, of course is not a new point, as seen in the 
discussion of the European Fertility Transition in the late nineteenth century and, 
among the behavior of various ethnic groups in the U.S., the similarity of 
movements in mortality of the black and white populations in the twentieth 
century. The basis of this similarity, whether due to technological externalities , 
external effects in communication of ideas, to diffused changes in tastes, or to 
direct intervention of international agencies or foreign countries, may be debated 
as can be the evaluation in of globalization and cross-country connections. Another 
cause of changing fertility and mortality patterns has been the existence of civil 
wars and international warfare, which have a rather long and continuous history. 
The deaths in Africa due to warfare in the past half century have been estimated to 
be over 15 million, although warfare plus diseases in Sub-Saharan Africa have been 
consistent with a pattern of basically unchanged fertility to 1990, with only a 
moderate decline in the next decade. The regions of Sub-Sahara African and South 
Asia do, however, have the highest fertility, although declining in recent years, as 
well as the lowest female literacy rates, but rather different female labor force 
participation rates. The relation of fertility rates to the degree of inequality 
requires more study, but it is probable that the degree of inequality raises fertility. 
 
  Among the worldwide trends in the second half of the twentieth century has 
been the increase in year of schooling of women and their labor force participation   15
rate, something that many expect to lead to a decline in fertility because of the 
increased value of a woman’s time and the effect this has on the cost of 
childbearing. This is clearly the predicted pattern for developed economies, where 
female labor force increases reflect an improvement in opportunities available to 
women, and also permit declines in child labor in order to increase their education. 
This relation, however ,has been u-shaped (Goldin, 1994), since women’s labor 
force participation is also very high when income levels are low and labor is 
needed from women or children to support the family at low levels of income. Sub-
Saharan Africa has had  high rates of female labor force activity, low rates of female 
schooling and literacy, and yet high rates of fertility which we can interpret as a 
consequence of the other important variables shaping fertility according to our 
analysis which is high rates of infant mortality. And, unlike other areas, it presents 
both high female labor force participation and high child labor force activity. We 
are thus back to the long-standing issue of policy towards some developing 
nations, how can we determine what actions to take,  who should become the 
major agents of change, and what is the feasible time period within which to 
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table 1a. Mean fertility by region, 1960 
Fertility 1960   Mean     Std. Dev.   Min  Max 
OECD  2.99  0.93  2.17  6.28 
Sub Saharan Africa  6.41  0.82  4.06  8 
Latin America  6.17  1.22  2.87  7.35 
Central Asia & Middle East  6.82  1.22  3.87  7.75 
South  Asia  6.31  0.75  5.27  6.98 
East Asia-Pacific  5.18  1.52  2.04  6.97 
non-OECD Europe  2.82  0.59  2.02  3.44 
North Africa  7.16  0.13  7.03  7.34 
 
Table 1b: Mean fertility by region, 2000 
Fertility, 2000   Mean     Std. Dev.   Min  Max 
OECD  1.65  0.28  1.23  2.16 
Sub Saharan Africa  5.33  1.37  1.85  7.64 
Latin America  2.90  1.03  1.64  6.08 
Central Asia & Middle East  3.33  1.44  1.38  7.05 
South  Asia  4.44  1.57  1.98  6.85 
East Asia-Pacific  2.67  1.14  0.94  5.21 
non-OECD Europe  1.45  0.28  1.1  1.95 
North Africa  2.91  0.68  1.96  3.71 
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Table 2a. Mean infant mortality rates by region, 1960 
IMR, 1960   Mean     Std. Dev.   Min  Max 
OECD  0.04  0.04  0.003  0.18 
Sub Saharan Africa  0.17  0.03  0.068  0.219 
Latin America  0.10  0.04  0.05  0.19 
Central Asia & Middle East  0.14  0.05  0.031  0.212 
South  Asia  0.15  0.05  0.069  0.186 
East Asia-Pacific  0.07  0.05  0.02  0.163 
non-OECD Europe  0.06  0.02  0.03  0.088 
North Africa  0.17  0.01  0.158  0.178 
Table 2a. Mean infant mortality rates by region, 2000 
IMR, 2000   Mean     Std. Dev.   Min  Max 
OECD  0.01  0.01  0.003  0.038 
Sub Saharan Africa  0.09  0.04  0.012  0.167 
Latin America  0.03  0.03  0.0072  0.159 
Central Asia & Middle East  0.04  0.03  0.006  0.102 
South  Asia  0.06  0.02  0.016  0.081 
East Asia-Pacific  0.04  0.03  0.0029  0.095 
non-OECD Europe  0.02  0.02  0.0041  0.08 













       
Figure 1. Trends in total fertility rates by region, 1960-2000 
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FIGURE 7. 
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TABLE 3: MORTALITY AND RACE; 20TH CENTURY US 
 
Evolution of life expectancies at birth(male) 
                                              White                   Black                  Difference (absolute) (years) 
1900                                        48                         33                          15 
1 920                                        56                         47                            9 
1940                                        63                         52                           11 
1960                                       68                         60                              8 
1990                                       73                         64                             9 
1998                                       74                         67                              7 
 
Evolution of infant mortality: 
                                             White                    Black                 Difference (absolute) (years) 
1915                                       98.6                      181.2                          82.6 
1930                                       60.1                      99.5                             39.4 
1940                                       43.2                      72.9                             29.7 
1960                                       22.9                       44.3                            21.4 
1980                                       10.9                       22.2                             11.3 
1998                                         6.0                       14.3                                8.3 
Source:  Carter,et al, Historical Statistics of the United States, Volume 1. 
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TABLE 4. 
 THE VARIABLES AFFECTING FERTILITY AT THE WORLD LEVEL, 1960-2000. 
Panel Regression Analysis with time fixed effects. 
 
Dependent variable: Fertility rates*1000. 
                                                            (1)                                  (2) 
                                                    
Per capita GDP                             0.0000265                    0.0001909 
                                                      (0.0000677)                   (0.000085)***  
Population                                  -0.0015422                      -0.0015061  
                                                      (0.0004781)*                  (0.00087)*    
Infant Mort*1000                         12.109                            11.668                     
                                                       (1.360017)***                (1.5537)***  
Infant M*Indian *1000                  0.6969                             0.05965 
                                                       (0.0530071)                   (0.05524)  
Infant M*Black *1000                    -0.122419                     -0.143567     
                                                      (0.019187)***                 (0.02145)***  
Female education                   -361.6868                        348.573 
(in years in school)                   (25.011)***                      (36.063)*** 
Ethnic fractionalization           758.9162 
                                                      (332.07) 
Indian                                              0.0688 
                                                        (7.20297) 
Black                                             14.46389       
                                                       (2.737671)*** 
1965                                              -48.3319                          -58.57068   
                                                      (87.09409)                       (86.379)   
1970                                           -206.2265                          -227.158 
                                                     (88.39939)                        (89.8002) 
1975                                           -384.8179                          -412.7802 
                                                      (90.760)***                       (96.1796)*** 
1980                                           -388.7844                           -413.858   27
                                                    (95.98228)***                    (108.9102)*** 
1985                                          -437.7118                             -465.7858               
                                                  (101.6275)***                        (121.2548)*** 
1990                                          -197.8845                               -232.8886                            
                                                 (109.7197)**                           (138.9787)*  
1995                                          -721.3549                                -736.1902                              
                                                  (117.525)***                            (154.081)**** 
2000                                         -651.1294                                  -661.2506                           
                                                 (125.974)***                              (172.2096)  
CONSTANT                             5059.169                                    5936.185 
                                              ( 227.0499)                                  (178.3941) 
N=                                           805                                               805 
R Squared within= 0.717; between=0.8181; overall=0.7904 
Wald Chi2 (17)=2211.21 
        
Data source: data on per capita GDP, Population and female human capital are from Barro Lee 
138 countries dataset for years 1960-85, and had been updated for years 1985-2000 by means 
of the World Bank Datasets. Data on Fertility and Infant Mortality come from the World Bank. 
Data on ethnicity com from Alberto Alesina dataset. The aggregation from ethnicity to  racial 
groups (black, Indian…) has been done aggregating Alesina’s data. This work was done by 
means of RA of two students from Harvard, Will Nygard and Carmen Madanes during the leave 
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TABLE 5. 
PANEL REGRESSION OF VARIABLES AFFECTING FERTILITY. TIME AND COUNTRY FIXED EFFECTS. 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: Fertility rates*1000 
                                                           (1)                                  (2)   
Per capita GDP                             0.0000885                  - 0.0000178 
                                                      (0.0001288)                  (0.0000545)* 
Population                                   -0.0012226                    -0.00209229 
                                                       (0.0018552)                  (0.0003575)****   
Share Urban Population             -0.0004248                     -4404.836 
                                                       (0.0028038)                  (2548.748)*     
Infant mortality(t)*1000               10.26584                      13.3975  
                                                       (2.8569)***                   (1.7528)*** 
Infant mortality(t-10)*1000          12.20599 
                                                       (2.247994)*** 
InfMort*1000*Indian                                                          -0.08272 
                                                                                            (0.031998)*** 
InfMort*1000*black                                                            -0.056054 
                                                                                             (0.016354)*** 
Years in school of women                                            -446.2092 
                                                                                          (27.87684)*** 
Ethnic fracc*infant*1000         -18.58352 
                                                       (4.213791)***       
Female school/male sch        -1180.001 
                                                       (294.6223)*** 
1975                                             -205.638 
                                                      (77.48136)* 
1980                                              -301.3689 
                                                      (83.42634)***   29
1985                                              -381.667 
                                                      (92.42747)*** 
1990                                              -230.7394 
                                                      (104.2312) 
1995                                            -836.1126 
                                                     (114.0434)*** 
2000                                         -873.9912 
                                                  (127.2808)*** 
Constant                                 4534.716                                         5479.544   
(316.2808)  (220.803)*** 
Time fixed effects                 1,310.52 
Country Fixed  Effects            498.9763                                            384.2125 
N                                                 632.00                                              764  
R squared within= 0.6636                                             R squared within=0.6987 
R Squared between=0.643                                          R squared between=0.7819  
R Squared   overall=0.5962                                          R squared overall=0.7551  
F(13,521)=79.02                                                              Wald chi2(7)=2185.03  
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TABLE 6 
•  EXPLAINING THE GENDER GAP. 
•  Dependent variable=log(ppp female earnings/ppp male earnings) 
•                                           (1)                      (2)                  (3)                 (4) 
•  Log per capita GDP      0.0009            -0.0228          -0.00977          -0.1752 
•                                       (0.0209)           (0.0208)        (0.0138)          ( 0.0155) 
•  Log female ec.act .       1.0534             0.9619            1.0881              0.9739 
•                                       (0.0958)***    (0.1002)***    (0.0897)***    (0.0986)***  
•  Latin America                -0.1416            -0.1685           -0.07564         -0.1658  
•                                       (0.0520)***     (0.0579)***   (0.0542)          (0.0529)*** 
•  East South Asia             0.0807              0.0642            0.0917            0.1107 
•                                       (0.0377)**       (0.4545)         ( 0.0369)***   (0.0351)*** 
•  Log education ga         -0.02971   
•  (years spent sch)         (0.0317)      
•  Market openess                                     0.0407 
•                                                               (0.3242) 
•  %Indian                                                                       -0.0463 
•                                                                                       (0.0023)***    
•  Log Wom in Govern                                                                              0.0614 
•                                                                                                                (0.03510)*  
•  Constant                        -4.5697          -4.1010           -4.5976             -4.2743  
•                                        (0.4230)***   (0.4311)***   (0.3504)***      (0.3765)*** 
•  N                                  122                  77                  118                   119 
•  R-squared                         0.592             0.569                0.650               0.599 
 
 
Data source: UN(2005): Human Development Report. 
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